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Annual Report to the Legislature:  
Waiver from Provisions of Sections 52-55 of Chapter 7 of  
Massachusetts General Laws 
 
 
Executive Summary 
 
The systemic collapse of the MBTA two winters ago year forced attention on the Authority’s 
problems and produced the political will to resolve them. One of the most effective tools for 
bringing real and lasting improvement to the T has proven to be the three-year exemption 
granted to the MBTA from the requirements of what is commonly known as the Pacheco Law. 
This report fulfills the statutory requirement that the MBTA annually update the General Court 
on the use and effectiveness of the Pacheco waiver and documents that the waiver has been a 
critical tool for moving the T toward being a more reliable and financially stable transit system. 
 
Though utilized only in carefully selected instances, and only after thorough review and 
extensive public discussion, the waiver has led to significant cost savings and more efficient 
operations, as detailed in this report. But the benefits from the waiver extend well beyond actual 
and projected operating dollars saved. The process of developing Requests for Information and 
Requests for Proposals has required the authority to comprehensively review entire business 
processes from beginning to end. Even when it does not result in outsourcing, the availability of 
the waiver has caused the Authority – and its unions – to examine and rethink internal processes 
and operations in ways that had rarely if ever happened before.  
 
Another example of how the waiver has catalyzed changes at the MBTA is the landmark 
agreement reached in 2016 with Carmen’s Union Local 589, which would not have been 
achieved without the leverage provided by the waiver. That agreement achieved a key union goal 
of protecting certain jobs of Local 589 members while enabling the T to obtain substantial 
savings on operating costs and, more importantly, to secure work rule and other reforms. The 
589 agreement, for example, has allowed the MBTA to execute multiple maintenance and 
modernization projects – running as many as five bus diversions simultaneously this summer – 
by allowing the T to contract out alternative bus services required to replace regular transit 
during construction projects. 
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As detailed in this report, actions fully transitioned from being run internally by the T to private 
vendors contracted per the waiver include: 
 
 Overtime and absence management: Contracting for a Third Party Administrator has 
helped the T reduce overtime expenses and absenteeism.  Better leave management has 
led to better performance for customers, with trips cancelled because of operator FMLA 
absence declining 18 percent in FY2017 compared to FY2016. 
 
  Cash collection and processing: As a result of contracting out cash operations, MBTA 
money is now collected, processed, and deposited more efficiently and cost-effectively.  
Time from collection to deposit has been reduced by 80 percent at the same time that 
monthly costs have dropped from nearly $1 million to under $300,000. 
 
 Warehouse and logistics operations: Outsourcing this critical function has ensured that 
T mechanics now get the parts they need to keep the T fleet running much more quickly 
while avoiding the need to invest MBTA capital dollars in a new warehouse facility to 
replace the dilapidated Everett warehouse. Contractor Mancon has achieved 99 percent 
on-time delivery and reduced the time it takes to respond and deliver parts by 85 percent, 
to an average of 10 hours, even while fully loaded costs have dropped by more than 40 
percent. 
 
 Customer service call center: A contract signed in June will provide the T with state-
of-the-art call center technologies designed to improve customer experience and reduce 
call volume while cutting costs by more than half over five years.  The contract will 
expand weekday hours and provide weekend customer service, which had been 
discontinued through the in-house call center due to budgetary pressures. 
 
 Customer service agents program: This contract, currently being phased in, will 
deliver improved customer service with “transit ambassadors” in stations using tablets 
and other technology to more quickly provide accurate information to customers and 
report system issues to T operations.  Once fully implemented by FY2019, the contract is 
expected to save the authority $4 million annually. 
 
  
3 
 
 
While these are the most advanced contracts implemented under the Pacheco waiver, the report 
also details other efforts currently underway: 
 Police dispatch: Staff review is nearly complete on a contract to shift operation of the 
Transit Police dispatch center to a professional civilian staff, with a goal of returning 
about 15 transit police officers to the streets within 60 days of contract signing. 
 
 Automated fare collection (AFC) 2.0:   In fall 2017 the MBTA will select a team to 
implement a new automated fare collection system that would enable customers to pay 
fares using mobile phones and credit cards as well as allowing the T to restructure its 
fares to be more equitable and affordable while maximizing ridership and revenue.  The 
winning bidder will design, implement, finance and operate the new system. 
 
 Bus maintenance: The MBTA issued a Request for Proposals in July to provide 
maintenance of MBTA-operated buses at up to three of the MBTA’s nine bus 
maintenance facilities.  Together the Arborway, Quincy and Lynn garages handle 28% of 
the MBTA bus fleet.  The MBTA’s own analysis of it bus maintenance activities, backed 
by independent assessments, found that the MBTA’s costs on a per-vehicle-mile basis 
were more than twice as expensive as the national average for comparable transit systems 
(those with more than 100 buses and an average fleet age of at least 9 years).  MBTA 
staff will present responses to the RFP to the control board later this fall. 
 
As these examples illustrate, the three-year exemption from the Pacheco requirements has 
provided the MBTA with an important tool to improve productivity by enabling a careful, 
deliberate and transparent process to understand internal costs and test the market for more cost-
effective ways to better serve MBTA customers.  As a result of use of the waiver to date, the 
MBTA is projected to save more than $400 million dollars in operating and avoided capital 
expenses over the next 10 years.  Going forward, the MBTA will both work to improve its 
internal productivity and cost-effectiveness but also consider, analyze and when appropriate act 
on opportunities to partner with the private sector to better serve the customers and communities 
that rely on the T. 
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Overview 
 
As part of the 2015 Appropriations Act (Chapter 46 of the Acts of 2015), which created the 
Fiscal and Management Control Board (FMCB), the General Court granted the MBTA a three-
year exemption, running from July 1, 2015 to July 1, 2018, from the requirements of sections 52 
to 55 of Chapter 7 of the Massachusetts General Laws, commonly known as the Pacheco Law. 
This report fulfills the statutory requirement that the MBTA file an annual report detailing: 
… [The number of service contracts and procurement contracts executed pursuant to this 
section. The report shall include, but not be limited to, the project or service contracted 
for, the term of the contract, the projected savings and any realized savings.  The report 
shall be filed with the clerks of the House of Representatives and the Senate who shall 
forward the same to the House and Senate Committees on Ways and Means and the Joint 
Committee on Transportation.  (Chapter 46 of the Acts of 2015, Section 196 (b)) 
 
Since 2015, MBTA management and the FMCB have undertaken a range of actions to improve 
the MBTA’s fiscal, operational, and physical condition. All of these steps, including discussions 
about and decisions to apply the waiver, have been done with full transparency; in just two years, 
the FMCB has held more than 100 meetings, including extensive public comment on agenda 
items and more than 500 presentations. Serious challenges remain, but real progress has been 
achieved to improve system performance and reliability. An operating budget deficit that had 
been forecast to explode has instead been dramatically reduced, for example, freeing up funds for 
capital improvements to improve the customer experience rather than to cover operating costs. 
 
While this report will describe operational and fiscal benefits resulting from the waiver, just its 
existence has led to other important improvements for the T and its customers. An example is 
bus diversions during capital project work. Because of the agreement with Local 589, the T has 
been able to contract out bus services required to replace regular transit during construction 
work. In many cases, privately provisioned bus diversions do not result in direct operating 
budget savings, but they have allowed the T to execute critical capital projects to improve system 
resiliency without increasing overtime, causing dropped trips, or putting additional burden on the 
MBTA’s bus fleet. 
 
Contracting out services to private vendors is a long-standing practice at the MBTA. The T 
performs a wide array of services to support operations, including human resources, financial 
management, procurement, information technology and communications, marketing and 
advertising, and real estate management. Several of these functions are managed through long-
standing relationships with third-party private vendors with the expertise to produce better and 
more efficient operations. In some cases, including commuter rail, The RIDE, ferries and several 
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bus routes, service delivery itself is contracted out. All Regional Transit Authorities contract out 
their bus operations and most contract out maintenance. 
 
Because of the waiver, the T can now issue RFIs and RFPs for certain in-house operations or 
services that could lend themselves to private partnering. Just the process of developing an RFP 
requires the T to comprehensively review the entire business process in question from beginning 
to end, something that in many instances simply had not been done at the T. 
  
Such careful assessment can reveal a combination of broken or missing business processes, 
antiquated technology, and workforce issues that may have been in place for decades but which 
had not been systemically diagnosed, let alone addressed. The process itself forces the issue of 
efficiencies and can sometimes propel unions and management to be more creative and work 
together to create efficiencies. 
 
The T itself has limited internal management capacity to perform such tasks. And even if 
managers were capable of fixing a certain operation or process, such focus would come at the 
cost of diverting them from other pressing priorities, often involving critical day-to-day 
operation of the system. 
 
The waiver has also helped to trigger a new level of engagement between the Authority and its 
unions. 
 
Historically, the MBTA’s unions have argued that any outsourcing efforts by the MBTA violated 
Section 13(c) of the federal Urban Mass Transit Act, thereby putting the MBTA’s federal 
funding at risk.  Generally speaking Section 13(c), and an implementing agreement between 
MBTA and the unions, are intended to protect MBTA employees from adverse employment 
consequences of federally funded projects.  An archetypical example is a federal grant for a 
public transit authority to buy automated equipment that results in employees being laid off. 
 
However, the restrictions of Section 13(c) are much narrower than the MBTA’s unions have 
claimed.  In connection with the outsourcing of “the Money Room,” where T cash was 
processed, one MBTA union argued that Section 13(c) required MBTA to bargain with the union 
concerning the outsourcing and required the outsourcing vendor to negotiate with the union over 
compensation for its own employees. This union invoked arbitration but an arbitrator rejected 
these arguments.  He held that Section 13(c) had no application to the Money Room outsourcing 
because a federal grant did not cause the MBTA to outsource the Money Room.  Instead, the 
MBTA outsourced the Money Room to achieve efficiencies and address longstanding security 
concerns and used state, not federal, funds for the outsourcing.  This is a significant precedent 
that should reduce union efforts to interfere with MBTA outsourcing efforts by invoking Section 
13(c). 
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Even as it develops RFPs and awards contracts, T management knows it is critical to install 
sufficient oversight capacity to make sure contracts are properly monitored and implemented. 
Failing to properly manage an outside vendor is as much of a failure as failing to properly 
manage an internal operation. That applies to all contracts issued by the T, waiver-related or not. 
And it is why the T must act to make sure vendors maintain standards set by the T, which is why 
the T insisted upon decisive action by the vendor overseeing Customer Service Agents after 
some of its employees acted improperly earlier this year. 
This report will highlight financial and operational results from current outsourcing efforts in 
three stages: 
A. Actions that have transitioned from in-house MBTA to private vendor:  
 Third Party Administrator 
 Cash collection and processing 
 Warehouse and logistics 
 Customer Service Call Center 
 Customer Service Agent Program 
 
B. Contract in the final stage of transition 
 Police Dispatch  
 
C. Outsourcing actions at RFP or other early stage:  
 Automated Fare Collection 
 Bus Maintenance  
 
In addition, a further set of outsourcing possibilities is enabled by the collective bargaining 
agreement with Local 589. These possibilities include Red and Orange Line Lifecycle 
Maintenance work and a new Bus Expansion facility. Contemplated lifecycle maintenance work 
includes contracting with private companies for component procurement and overhaul and/or full 
vehicle mid-life overhaul for light and heavy rail vehicles. This has the potential to streamline 
internally provisioned heavy maintenance functions as vehicle maintenance becomes more 
technologically advanced. For example, third-parties could provide end-to-end procurement 
services of component parts and heavy repair, ensuring availability while internal staff focuses 
its efforts on managing component lifecycles. 
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Uses of flexible contracting under the waiver 
 
A. Fully transitioned 
 
1. Third Party Administrator 
The MBTA’s first use of the waiver came in response to one of the key instances of weak MBTA 
management identified by the Governor’s Special Panel on the MBTA in 2015, which found that 
excessive absenteeism was causing substantial overtime costs and tens of thousands of cancelled 
bus trips annually, inconveniencing customers.  
Of $53 million spent on overtime in FY2015, for example, $11 million was due to the need to 
cover vacant positions and unscheduled absences. More than one-third of unscheduled absences 
were attributable to employees’ use of federal Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) 
provisions to take leave for specified family and medical reasons. 
 
The FMCB called for the MBTA to audit employees’ use of FMLA, focusing on: 
 
 Employee eligibility; 
 Adequacy of medical documentation; 
 Expiration or exhaustion of approved leave; 
 Usage in excess of approved frequency and duration; 
 Need for medical recertification; 
 Accuracy of data tracking. 
 
The audit led to a series of corrective internal steps, including better training and a new 
attendance policy that became effective in January, 2016. These steps helped to improve leave 
management at the T, but the ability granted by the waiver to outsource for market expertise and 
capacity proved to be critical to greater, more sustainable improvement. A Request for Proposals 
for a Third Party Administrator (TPA) to review and improve leave and attendance policies, 
manage leaves and operate an employee call center was the first to be issued pursuant to the 
waiver.   
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On May 13, 2016, the MBTA signed a three-year contract with UPMC WorkPartners, with a 
one-year option, at an annual cost of about $750,000, requiring, among other things: 
 A centralized 24/7 Absence Call Center, providing easy self-service access for 
employees using multiple media and real-time notification of employee’s supervisors; 
 Detailed information collection and data management on attendance history and medical 
documentation; 
 Legal compliance for federal and state leaves in addition to relevant MBTA policies; 
 Rigorous absence case management. 
 
The combination of improved internal performance and outside contracting with an experienced 
vendor has delivered results. Average daily overtime expense fell by 19 percent in FY2017 
compared to FY2015. The average daily hours of overtime was reduced by 22 percent over from 
FY2014 to FY2017. FMLA usage greater than five days in FY2017 has dropped by 15 percent 
compared to FY2014. 
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Case Load Management 
The last three fiscal years have seen increases in case load from the overall number of requests 
for FMLA and subsequent determination of leave for employees. The following chart shows the 
successive percentage increases since FY2015.  The case load alone for FY2017 would have 
exceeded in-house resources potentially adding risk for compliance as well as the overall 
absence management program. 
 
 
Beyond cost savings from overtime, this new approach to leave management has produced 
benefits for both employees and riders: 
 
 Bus supervisors no longer have to field absence-related calls, struggle to confirm if an 
employee has an approved leave or not, nor guess if the employee has time remaining; 
 Employees have access to real time information on their leave balances and application 
status of any pending leaves; they make one call for all unscheduled time-off; 
 Trips canceled because of operator FMLA absence declined 18 percent in FY2017 
compared to FY2016. 
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2. Cash Collection and Processing 
Outside agencies had long documented serious problems with the MBTA’s cash collection and 
counting operations. In September 2012, for example, a report from the State Auditor on the 
MBTA’s automated fare collection system found, among other things, that actual cash fare box 
receipts deposited between July 1, 2006 to June 30, 2011 were $123.8 million while the system 
software recorded $225.5 million in fare box cash receipts, a variance of nearly $102 million. 
Despite occasional efforts to resolve problems, the T’s cash collection and counting process 
remained inefficient, ineffective, and unsafe for employees. Moreover, cash collection operations 
distracted from more critical customer-facing priorities, diverting time and resources away from 
core transit functions. Despite the history of problems, the T had never conducted a 
comprehensive, top-to-bottom review and assessment of its cash processing operation and 
procedures. Rather, the T remained one of the few major public or private institutions to handle 
and process their own cash; most have instead turned that sensitive function over to market 
leaders with proven capacity.  
Last year, the results of an external audit commissioned by the Authority served as a reminder of 
the challenges facing the T’s internally run cash processing operation. Among other things, that 
audit found that:  
 23 percent of wireless information transfers were unsuccessful; 
 5 percent of cash boxes didn’t transfer information to mobile vaulting units; 
 60 percent of information transfers from mobile vaulting units were unsuccessful. 
 
With such serious problems still apparent, the T proceeded to launch an assessment to determine 
whether an RFP should be issued. 
The waiver meant the MBTA could now turn to leading industry players with decades of 
expertise and experience to help develop the RFP and to eventually manage this critical and 
sensitive operation. The T retained seasoned consultants to conduct the pre-RFP analysis but 
almost immediately, those experts identified numerous security threats to both T employees and 
cash assets. The T took immediate action to counter these risks, which, without the outside audit, 
might have been left undetected. 
Based on information provided to it by the outside experts and T staff, the FMCB authorized a 
Request for Proposals on July 22, 2016, seeking proposals from leaders in the business of cash 
processing to resolve remaining reconciliation and other issues and to identify opportunities for 
cost savings. On October 6, 2016, the FMCB voted to award a two-year, $7.2 million contract to 
Brink’s Inc., with MBTA options for three additional one-year contracts. The total value of the 
five-year agreement is $18.7 million.  
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 Less than a year later, this contract has already: 
o Improved operations and reconciliation processes  
o Reduced operating costs to T 
o Resulted in additional revenue flow to T 
o Avoided need for capital investment by T in its Charlestown “Money Room” 
Operational improvements have transformed all aspects of the cash processing operation. These 
changes range from more efficient scheduling of routes for drivers who collect cash to more 
systemic maintenance of fare boxes and other equipment. Prior to the contract, for example, 
broken equipment was poorly tracked, sometimes resulting in non-functioning fare equipment 
coming in and going right back out again. Under Brinks, machine maintenance is now properly 
monitored. Similarly, daily cash pickups, which under the T had been inefficient and 
inconsistent, are now based on a clear schedule set in advance.  Drivers now know when and 
where they are going, compared to the past inefficient practice of T drivers often waiting around 
for instruction. 
Not only is money from fare vending machines and fare boxes being collected more reliably, it is 
being safely deposited much more quickly.  
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Brinks has rapidly improved cash collection efficiency and reduced the time from collection to 
deposit by eighty percent. Business process improvements include streamlined route structure for 
armored trucks, shorter time “on premises” when Brinks’ employees preform pick-ups, faster 
cash and coin processing, depositing cash on-site at processing facility through a virtual vault, as 
well as faster reconciliation prior to deposit and real-time reporting.  
Even as MBTA money is now collected, processed, and deposited more securely and efficiently, 
the T is also saving significant operating costs in the process. Whereas the T spent an average of 
nearly $1 million to handle cash, by June 2017, Brinks was doing so at a monthly cost of 
$270,000. Not only is Brinks’ cost of cash handling roughly one third of internally provisioned 
service, Brinks’ is also running 15 percent below their monthly contract value of $300,000 
through June 2017.  
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3. Warehouse and Logistics  
 
An efficient and reliable warehouse and logistics operations is fundamental to a transit system’s 
ability to provide safe and reliable service. If parts are difficult to locate because of poor 
inventory systems or if mechanics have to wait for excessive time to get the parts they need to 
repair a vehicle, riders suffer because buses and other vehicles are either out of service or are not 
operating properly. 
Seeking to assess the productivity and performance of its warehouse, materials management, and 
logistics operation, the MBTA turned to a team of industry experts. Their review, which was 
completed in mid-2015 and presented to the FMCB, revealed a completely broken system with 
standard business practices that were either not in place at all or were not properly followed, with 
a direct impact on riders. Broken vehicles account for about one of five dropped bus trips and 
missing parts and long wait times for parts to get to mechanics were a major factor in these 
dropped drips, which inconvenience riders.  
Among other things, the expert analysis found: 
 The T’s inventory accuracy was well below industry standards. Compared to an industry 
standard of 95 percent inventory accuracy, the T’s was just 56 percent.  
 The T had $22.7 million in excess inventory.  
 The time to respond and deliver requested parts at the T was six times longer than the 
industry standard. 
 
Despite these and other problems and inefficiencies, however, total operating costs for the T 
warehouse and logistics operation were high. T staff and their experts believed that partnering 
with industry would save MBTA about $5 million a year in operating costs and would enable the 
Authority to avoid $16 million in capital improvements to its existing warehouse facilities. 
In view of these and other findings, MBTA management issued an RFP on June 22, 2016. On 
January 9, 2017, the FMCB approved a five-year contract with Management Consulting, Inc., 
(Mancon) to manage the MBTA's warehouse operations, with a projection of $64.2 million in 
total savings and avoided capital costs. 
T management reported to the FMCB on May 22, 2017, that Mancon was “performing all tasks 
at or above contract requirements.” Among other improvements: 
 The first physical inventory of MBTA parts in 15 years was begun. 
 Improved inventory accuracy and parts delivery resulted in more efficient operations and 
stocking of parts.  
 Delivery from the Everett central warehouse to garages is now more than 99 percent on-
time. The time to respond and deliver parts now averages 10 hours under Mancon, an 85 
percent improvement over the internally run MBTA operation. 
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Mancon’s performance to date includes ninety-nine percent on time delivery and shipment 
accuracy. , the T has also experienced significant cost savings as a result of the transition to 
Mancon, with fully loaded costs dropping by more than 40 percent. 
Moreover, Mancon has delivered 21,569 parts to date. Finally, Mancon has reduced time to 
respond and deliver parts by 85 percent. All parts ordered by 6:00 pm are delivered by 4:00 am 
the next morning across all garages.  
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Even as it sees these significant operational improvements, the T has also experienced significant 
cost savings as a result of the transition to Mancon, with fully loaded costs dropping by more 
than 40 percent. 
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4. Customer Service Call Center 
 
From FY2013 to FY2016, the volume of inquiries to the MBTA’s Customer Communication 
Center, which worked to record, communicate, and resolve customer complaints by working 
with other MBTA departments, fell by 25 percent. But over the same period, the cost to operate 
the in-house operation rose by six percent. So when the MBTA received an innovation proposal 
expressing interest in providing call center services similar to or better than those being 
performed by the T, it helped lead to the FMCB’s approval to issue an RFP from industry leaders 
interested in assuming the call center functions. 
The RFP, which was issued in December 2016, generated eight responses. Four bidders were 
interviewed and pricing was opened for two bidders. On May 1, 2017, the FMCB authorized the 
T to enter into final contract negotiations with Global Contact Services (GCS) to run MBTA 
customer contact operations. A $5.8 million contract for three years plus two one-year options 
was signed with GCS on June 1, 2017. 
Partnering with GCS delivers a range of operational benefits to both the T and its customers. By 
adopting a more flexible model, the T will shift internal focus to customer complaint resolution 
and service delivery improvement. Moreover, the T will benefit from new state-of-the-art call 
center technologies which should help improve customer experience and reduce call volume. 
Finally, GCS operates a flexible staffing model that allows for adjusting capacity based on 
customer demand. The fixed fee model incentivizes GCS to create robust self-service options for 
callers while penalty and incentive regimes help to ensure demand is met during peak service 
hours, emergencies or weather disruptions.  
GCS is also expanding weekday hours and will provide customer service on weekends, which 
was discontinued with the MBTA’s in-house Customer Communication Center due to budgetary 
pressures. 
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The contract with GCS also cuts customer call center operations costs to the MBTA by more 
than half over the five years. 
 
Key service-level agreements in the contract with GCS include a 45-second average call 
answering speed, a five percent abandonment rate for calls with waits longer than 45 seconds, 
post-call survey satisfaction greater than eighty percent, secret shopper satisfaction, and error-
free data entry greater than 97 percent.    
The MBTA contract management team is actively supervising GCS through daily service and 
performance monitoring, weekly staffing-level check-ins, monthly data quality audits, on-
demand call recording reviews, monthly service level agreements and penalty payment reviews, 
and monthly service efficiency improvement plans. 
GCS has committed to improving the technology used by the MBTA. GCS will focus on 
reducing how long it takes to get to an agent and on improving available self-service options. 
The 22 MBTA customer service agents who had worked in the T’s internal operation either 
bumped into other positions or were offered bus operator positions. 
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5. Customer Service Agents Program 
 
Seeking to significantly improve customer service in its stations while reducing costs, on April 3, 
2017, the MBTA posted a Request for Proposals from hospitality industry leaders to take over 
the functions of the T’s own Customer Service Agents (CSA) program. A contract not to exceed 
$4.1 million for one year with three one-year options signed on July 31, 2017, with Mydatt 
Services Inc. (doing business as Block by Block) is now in the process of being fully 
implemented. Once fully phased in by FY2019, this contract is expected to save the Authority $4 
million a year.  
More important than the cost savings, the new contract with Block by Block will use best-in-
business practices to deliver higher quality customer service. Benefits to T customers include 
additional service hours in stations and significantly increased weekend coverage. Block by 
Block “Transit Ambassadors” will also utilize tablets and other technology to more quickly 
provide accurate information to customers. They will also be able to report system issues in real-
time to T operations or other departments. 
As part of its new agreement with Local 589, all T CSAs will retain their current roles until they 
retire or leave the Authority or transition into other positions, such as rail operator.  The first 
pilot stations, Chinatown and Mass Ave, launched in early August. Starting September 3, the 
program will commence in an additional five core stations: South Station, North Station, State 
Street, Park Street and Downtown Crossing. These stations will interact with all of the MBTA 
rail lines, along with commuter rail and bus transfers. 
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B.  Contract in final stage of implementation 
 
 Police Dispatch 
 
In an effort to return underutilized police officers sitting in dispatch to their mission of protecting 
and assisting customers, the MBTA issued an RFP on June 19, 2017, seeking a qualified private 
vendor to assume responsibility for the dispatching of transit police. This RFP was issued about a 
year after the FMCB instructed the MBTA to revise and reissue an earlier version of the police 
dispatch RFP. 
The single bidder responding to the current RFP is under review by T staff, which will present 
the bid to the FMCB in the near future.  
Instead of staffing the dispatch operation with police officers who can be better utilized by 
patrolling on the system, dispatch will be operated by a professional, civilian staff whose sole 
responsibility at the MBTA will be to provide dispatch services. The vendor will be held 
accountable to high standards to ensure that all 911 callers are properly handled by helpful, 
assuring, and confident dispatchers. The service provider that the MBTA will choose will be 
responsible for implementing a quality assurance and continuous improvement program to 
ensure that dispatchers are providing accurate information to callers and that they do so with the 
proper demeanor. 
By contracting out police dispatch, the MBTA will be able to reduce its current reliance on 
overtime to fully staff the dispatch operation. Moving to a predictable, fixed-cost contract will 
further advance fiscal stability for the T's operating budget. 
The goal is to return about 15 transit police officers to the streets within about 60 days of a 
contract signing. 
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C.  Outsourcing actions at RFP or other early stage 
 
1. Automated Fare Collection (AFC) 2.0 
 
In order to improve customer experience with standardized payments across all modes, improve 
service, reduce vehicle dwell time by allowing all-door boarding, allow greater flexibility in 
future fare policy, and permit additional integration across modes, the T is planning a complete 
overhaul of its fare collection system. 
This system will greatly expand ways to pay fares with mobile phones, T cards and credit cards. 
It will also expand the point-of-sale network by partnering with retail locations and the 
introduction of new devices. Moreover, new back office systems will improve revenue 
accounting and reporting, and allow for the adoption of more innovative fare structures. 
The new system is being procured through a contract with an industry-leading vendor in a two-
step competitive process. The first phase was an RFQ issued on July 18, 2016. The next phase, 
which is currently under way, is a formal Request for Proposals process with the pre-qualified 
vendors with selection to be based upon best value to the MBTA.   
The winning bidder will be responsible for the core functions of design, implementation, 
financing, operations and maintenance of AFC 2.0 including: 
 All fare collection hardware and software; 
 System integration, testing, implementation and transition to full AFC 2.0 operations; 
 Card manufacture, supply, retail network, and vending; 
 Bank interfaces; and 
 System operations and maintenance for not less than ten years. 
The contract between the MBTA and the Systems Integrator will be performance-based, with 
primary payments commencing upon systems operations and subject to compliance with key 
performance indicators.  This project delivery will combine the core, long-term functions of the 
project under a single contract in order to provide for: 
 A single point of responsibility; 
 Expedited project delivery; and 
 A life-cycle cost approach to project decision making. 
Selection of the vendor is scheduled for the fall of 2017, with AFC 2.0 set to go live in 2020. 
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2. Bus Maintenance 
On July 21, 2017, the MBTA issued a Request for Proposals from vendors to improve bus 
maintenance productivity while assuring safe and reliable buses for customers.  Under a future 
contract, a private contractor will provide maintenance of MBTA-owned buses at up to three of 
the MBTA’s nine bus maintenance facilities (Arborway, Quincy, and Lynn).  
The RFP is one part of the FMCB’s three-part approach to reducing bus maintenance costs. The 
first part of this approach – and the one the FMCB said was its preferred approach -- is to 
achieve cost savings and productivity improvements through negotiations with the unions 
representing MBTA bus maintenance employees. Those discussions are ongoing. The second 
piece of the FMCB’s strategy is to enhance productivity through internal management initiatives, 
which includes streamlining staffing levels and modernizing business processes. The third 
component of the three-part approach is to test the market by issuing an RFP seeking bids from 
private sector leaders to improve bus maintenance productivity while providing safe and reliable 
service. 
The MBTA’s own analysis of its bus maintenance activities, backed by independent assessments, 
found that on a per-vehicle-mile basis, the MBTA’s costs were more than twice as expensive as 
the national average for public transit systems with more than 100 buses and an average fleet age 
of at least nine years. Unsolicited bids received by the MBTA from three private bus companies 
in March 2017 under the MBTA’s innovation proposal policy indicated that the MBTA could 
save between 30 percent and 40 percent per year on bus maintenance costs at several of the 
MBTA’s smaller bus garages. 
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Besides cost savings, potential benefits from contracting for bus maintenance include: 
 
 Greater operational flexibility to meet future customer needs; 
 Introduction of modern technology and updated business processes; 
 More flexible workforce practices. 
The RFP seeks proposals that will mirror the public/private partnership operating model already 
used by the state’s 15 Regional Transit Authorities. The RFP calls for the vendor to put buses 
into service; once a bus leaves the yard and enters into revenue service, the MBTA Operations 
Control Center will assume dispatching functions and maintain direction over the buses. Buses 
will continue to be driven by MBTA bus operators who belong to Local 589. 
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The RFP being issued calls for a 3.5-year contract, with two additional one-year options. The 
three bus garages listed in the RFP handle 28 percent of the MBTA bus fleet. Respondents to the 
RFP must bid on one, two, or all three garages.  
The RFP requires that the vendor winning the contract give first hiring preference for 
machinist/mechanic positions to existing MBTA machinists who may be displaced. It also asks 
bidders to provide price proposals with the option for a defined benefit retirement pension plan 
for machinists under any resulting contract. 
 
The MBTA expects to present RFP responses to the FMCB at a future meeting. 
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Conclusion 
Two years into the waiver of Pacheco law requirements, the FMCB and MBTA management 
have been diligent in considering how, when, and whether to utilize it. Decisions to outsource in-
house MBTA processes and operations have come only after a dynamic process of internal and 
independent analysis and extensive outreach to and feedback from a range of stakeholders. 
The FMCB will continue to work with MBTA management and the Authority’s workforce and 
their unions to seek further gains in efficiency and productivity. And both the MBTA and FMCB 
will continue to incorporate the views of all stakeholders as outsourcing possibilities are raised 
and discussed. 
As detailed in this report, the FMCB’s limited use of the waiver has already generated real 
benefits. Some are measured in operating cost savings, which are being used for system 
maintenance and improvements to enhance the customer experience. Other benefits from use of 
the waiver are avoided capital expenses as well as improved operations and processes: functions 
that had been run in-house by the T are now being performed more efficiently and effectively by 
private sector firms that have extensive experience in running such operations. Due to use of the 
waiver to date, the MBTA is projected to save more than $400 million dollars in operating and 
avoided capital expenses over the next 10 years. 
It is critical that the MBTA continue to carefully monitor these contracts for compliance and 
performance. That is why, for instance, that even as it issued its bus maintenance RFP, the 
MBTA also began the process of hiring contract managers to be in place when and if bus 
maintenance contract results.  
Going forward, the FMCB will continue to consider, analyze, and act upon opportunities to 
partner with the private sector in ways that can help lead to both fiscal stability and improved 
performance for the people, communities, and regional economy that depend upon a reliable, 
well-functioning MBTA. 
 
